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1 Dynamic process
For convenience, we first restate the relevant elements of the model. A single asset pays a dividend
that depends on a state ω(t) drawn from a finite set Ω. The state evolves according to an ergodic
continuous-time stationary Markov process with transition rates q(ω, ω′). Trading occurs at discrete
times t = 0,∆, 2∆, . . . . We write ωk for ω(k∆) and q∆(ω, ω
′) for the transition probabilities between
trading periods. A constant per-unit flow dividend of d(ωk) is paid from time k∆ to (k + 1)∆.
A continuum of agents indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] trades the asset in each period. Trading decisions
are based on the current dividend and on agents’ forecasts of the prices in the following period.
Agents form these forecasts as follows. Each agent i categorizes states according to a partition Πi
of Ω that is fixed across all periods. For each state ω, let Π(ω) denote the element of the partition
Π containing ω. In period k, agent i forms a forecast Qik+1 of the price in period k+ 1 according to
Qik+1 =
∑
s<k−1:ωs∈Πi(ωk) ps+1∑
s<k−1:ωs∈Πi(ωk) 1
whenever the denominator is nonzero (otherwise take the forecast to be some arbitrary fixed num-
ber), where ps denotes the market price in period s as described below. Thus the price forecast
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Qik+1 is formed by averaging all prices that occurred in periods immediately following those in
which the state was in the same category as the current one (according to Πi).
Each agent i forms demand αik in period k proportional to her net expected profit from holding
the asset for one period:
αik =
(
1− e−∆) d(ωk) + e−∆Qik+1 − pk.
Assuming zero supply, the market clearing price is
pk =
∫
i
pikdi, (1)
where pik is agent i’s reservation price in period k, defined by
pik =
(
1− e−∆) d(ωk) + e−∆Qik+1. (2)
Let Π1, . . . ,ΠN denote those partitions belonging to a positive measure of agents, and denote
by pin the measure of agents using Πn. Letting p
n
k denote the reservation price of each agent from
group n, the market price pk is
pk =
N∑
n=1
pinp
n
k .
2 Steady-state prices
Proposition 1 below shows that this learning process converges to steady-state prices P : Ω −→ R
that depend only on the current state. Steady-state prices turn out to be identical to rational
expectations prices, not with respect to the true process, but with respect to a different process
that reflects both the true process q∆ and the categorizations used by agents.
Definition 1. Given any ∆, prices P (ω) are (steady-state) rational expectations prices with respect
to a Markov process m on Ω and a dividend function d if
P (ω) = (1− e−∆)d(ω) + e−∆Em(ω,ω′)[P (ω′)]
for every ω ∈ Ω.1
1Note that for any m and d, rational expectations prices exist and are unique.
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Let φ denote the stationary distribution of states with respect to the true process q. For given
initial prices and a given realization of the sequence of states (ωs)
k−1
s=0 , let pk(ω) denote the price in
period k that would obtain if ωk = ω. Define the modified process by
m∆(ω, ω
′) =
N∑
n=1
pin
∑
ω′′∈Πn(ω)
φ
(
ω′′ |Πn(ω)
)
q∆(ω
′′, ω′). (3)
Proposition 1. For each ∆, the sequence pk(ω) almost surely converges to the vector P∆(ω) of
rational expectations with respect to the modified process m∆ and the dividend function d.
Proposition 1 is a corollary of Proposition 2 below.
To understand the modified process m∆, first consider the case in which all agents distinguish all
states, i.e. Πi(ω) = {ω} for every ω and i. In this this case, m∆ = q∆, and hence the long-run prices
are precisely the rational expectations prices with respect to the true process. To see why, consider
the forecasting procedure. In period k, each agent uses data from previous periods s < k − 1 in
which the state was indistinguishable from the current state (according to her own categorization).
For the finest categorization, these relevant periods are those s such that ωs = ωk. In the steady
state, the agent’s forecast is just the average of P (ωs+1) across the relevant periods s. In the long
run, the forecast is equal to
∑
ω′ q∆(ωk, ω
′)P (ω′), coinciding with the rational expectation of the
price in the next period.
For general categorizations, a given agent’s forecast is based on all previous periods s in which
the state ωs belonged to the current category Π
i(ωk). In the long run, the average of P (ωs+1) for
those values of s is equal to
∑
ω′′∈Πi(ω)
φ
(
ω′′
∣∣Πi(ω)) q∆(ω′′, ω′)P (ω′),
where the term φ
(
ω′′
∣∣Πi(ω)) captures the long-run frequency of state ω′′ in the sample of relevant
periods s. Taking the average across agents, the population-wide forecast is the expectation with
respect to the modified process m∆ in (3).
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The next section extends Proposition 1 in two directions. First, we extend the price forecasting
2The modified process is closely related to the coarse expectation formation in Eyster and Piccione (2013). Indeed,
applying Proposition 1 to a homogenous population gives convergence to Eyster’s and Piccione’s stationary price
function with respect to the agents’ categorization.
3
rule to a general class of similarity-based rules in which agents forecast using data from similar
past states. Unlike the categorization considered here, the weights assigned to different states may
vary according to the perceived degree of similarity. Second, we allow for an arbitrary fraction of
agents to form rational expectations knowing all parameters of the model, including other agents’
forecasting procedures. In the long run, such agents have the same effect on prices as agents who
categorize every state separately.
3 Proof and Generalizations
This section proves convergence of the above learning process, extends the result to a more general
class of processes in which agents learn from similar past states, and shows that our results remain
unchanged if we allow for some agents to form rational expectations. We start by describing
learning by similarity, which includes categorization as a special case. We then consider an even
more general class of processes that is sufficiently broad to allow for the inclusion of agents who
form rational expectations about future states and other agents’ behavior.
3.1 Learning by similarity
The categorization framework of Section 1 is a special case of a model in which agents learn prices
based on past prices in states similar to the current one, but do not necessarily apply equal weight
to all similar states. Proposition 1 extends to this more general case.
Each agent i is endowed with a symmetric similarity function gi : Ω × Ω −→ R+ determining
the weight assigned to various states in forming forecasts of future prices. We assume that for each
i and ω, there exists some ω′ such that gi(ω, ω′) 6= 0. Given a history of states and prices up to
period k − 1, agent i’s forecast in period k of the price in period k + 1 is
Qik+1 =
∑
s<k−1 gi(ωk, ωs)ps+1∑
s<k−1 gi(ωk, ωs)
whenever the denominator is nonzero, and some fixed constant otherwise. Thus the forecast is
formed by averaging the one-period-ahead prices in all past states, weighted according to the
degree of similarity to the current state. The categorization of Section 1 is a special case of this
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framework in which, for each i, gi takes only the values 0 and 1.
For simplicity, we assume that only a finite number of different similarity functions are used
by the agents. That is, there exists a finite partition of the population into groups of measures
pi1, . . . , piN , and similarity functions g1, . . . , gN such that, for each n, every agent in n’s group uses
similarity function gn. As before, each agent’s action in each period is given by (2) and the market
price in period k is the population-wide average action given by (1).
We show in the next subsection that Proposition 1 carries over directly to this setting except
that the modified process m∆ is defined more generally by
m∆(ω, ω
′) =
N∑
n=1
pin
∑
ω′′ gn(ω, ω
′′)φ(ω′′)q∆(ω′′, ω′)∑
ω′′ gn(ω, ω
′′)φ(ω′′)
. (4)
Within each group, in the steady-state price forecasts, the weight given to each possible state ω′ one
period ahead is based on the likelihood of transitions to ω′ from each state ω′′ similar to the current
state ω. The weight given to the transition from ω′′ to ω′ depends on the similarity between ω and
ω′′ together with the frequency φ(ω′′) with which state ω′′ occurs. The aggregate distribution m∆
is obtained by averaging the individual distributions across all agents. Note that, as before, agents
should be interpreted as behaving, in the long-run, as if they believe (on average) that the state
evolves according to m∆; agents do not literally hold these beliefs.
3.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The general learning process is as follows. The state space Ω and the true process q are as in the
main text. Without loss of generality, let ∆ = 1. Let ωk = (ωs)
k
s=0 denote the finite history of
states up to period k, and pk = (ps)
k−1
s=0 be the history of prices up to period k − 1. We assume
that all prices lie in a bounded interval [p, p]. The price pk in period k is determined according to
pk = (1− ρ)d(ωk) + ρQ
(
ωk,pk
)
, (5)
where Q :
⋃
k
(
Ωk × [p, p]k−1) −→ [p, p] can be interpreted as the average forecast of the price in
period k + 1 and ρ = e−1 is the discount factor.
We assume that Q satisfies the following condition.
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A1. There exists a continuous monotone function
E : [p, p]Ω −→ [p, p]Ω
such that, for any P , P ∈ [p, p]Ω, any K, and any ε > 0, if
Pr
(
pk ∈ [P , P ] ∀k > K
)
> 1− ε, (6)
then for any δ > 0 there exists K ′ such that, for each ω,
Pr
(
Q
((
ωk, ω
)
,pk
)
∈ (E(P )(ω)− δ, E(P )(ω) + δ) ∀k > K ′) > 1− ε− δ. (7)
In the case of a homogeneous population using similarity function g, the learning process from
Section 3.1 (and hence also the categorization-based learning from Section 1) is captured by
Qsim
(
ωk,pk
)
=

∑
s<k−1 g(ωk,ωs)ps+1∑
s<k−1 g(ωk,ωs)
if
∑
s<k−1 g(ωk, ωs) > 0,
p0 otherwise,
where p0 is arbitrary. For a heterogeneous population, Q is obtained by aggregating the values of
Qsim across groups (see Lemma 2).
Lemma 1. For any similarity function g, Qsim satisfies A1 with
E(P )(ω) =
∑
ω′
m∆(ω, ω
′)P (ω′),
where m∆ is the modified process in (4).
Proof. We prove only the upper bound; the proof for the lower bound is similar. Suppose that for
some K, ε > 0, and P , Pr
(
pk ≤ P ∀k > K
)
> 1 − ε. Given any δ > 0 and γ > 0, by the Law of
Large Numbers, there exists some K ′ > K such that, with probability greater than 1− δ, for every
pair (ω′, ω′′) and every k > K ′, the fraction of periods s < k such that (ωs, ωs+1) = (ω′, ω′′) lies in
(φ(ω′)q∆(ω′, ω′′)− γ, φ(ω′)q∆(ω′, ω′′) + γ). Since the process q∆ is ergodic, we can choose K ′ such
that this property holds regardless of the history ωK . Furthermore, for K ′ > K/γ, ps ≤ P (ωs)
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for a fraction of at least 1 − γ periods s ≤ k with probability greater than 1 − ε, in which case
the average of the prices ps+1 across those periods s such that (ωs, ωs+1) = (ω
′, ω′′) is at most
(1− γ)P (ω′′) + γp. Hence for k > K ′, we have
Qsim
(
ωk,pk
)
≤
∑
ω′,ω′′ g(ωk, ω
′′)(φ(ω′′)q∆(ω′′, ω′) + γ)((1− γ)P (ω′) + γp)∑
ω′′ g(ωk, ω
′′)(φ(ω′′)− γ)
with probability greater than 1− ε− δ. Given δ > 0, we can choose γ > 0 sufficiently small so that
the right-hand side of the preceding inequality is less than E(P )(ωk) + δ, as needed.
In the main text, agents differ in their forecasting procedures and the price is determined by the
average of agents’ forecasts. The following lemma indicates that A1 aggregates across heterogeneous
groups.
Lemma 2. Suppose that a fraction pin of the population use prediction rule Q
n, with
∑N
n=1 pin = 1.
Suppose moreover that all rules Qn satisfy A1 with functions En(P ) respectively. Finally assume
that price evolution is governed by (5) with prediction rule Q =
∑
pinQ
n. Then Q satisfies A1 with
E(P ) = ∑n pinEn(P ).
Proof. Using the property of A1 with pinδ for each subpopulation and taking the maximum of the
K ′ needed for each process gives the result.
Proposition 1 is a special case of the following convergence result.
Proposition 2. If Q satisfies A1, prices are determined according to (5), and the mapping (1 −
ρ)d + ρE is a contraction (with respect to some metric) then prices almost surely converge to the
unique fixed point of d+ ρE.
In the case of learning by similarity, (1−ρ)d+ρE is a contraction with respect to the sup norm,
and we therefore obtain convergence to a unique price profile, proving Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. The mapping (1−ρ)d+ρE has extreme fixed points P ∗, P ∗: for every fixed
point P ∗, we have P ∗ ≤ P ∗ ≤ P ∗. This follows immediately from Tarski’s Fixed Point Theorem
since [p, p]Ω is a complete lattice and (1− ρ)d+ ρE is continuous and monotone.
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We will prove that for each ω, the set of cluster points of (pk(ω))k is almost surely contained
in [P ∗(ω), P ∗(ω)]. The proposition follows immediately since the fixed point is unique when (1 −
ρ)d+ ρE is a contraction.
We prove only that the cluster points are almost surely at most P
∗
(ω). The proof of the lower
bound is similar.
Let P 0 = p1, where 1 denotes the vector with a 1 in each component, and for l ∈ N+, let
P l = (1 − ρ)d + ρE(P l−1). Since P l is nonincreasing in l, liml P l exists and is a fixed point of
(1− ρ)d+ ρE (by continuity of E).
Note that pk ≤ P 0(ωk) for each k > 0. Suppose for induction that, given any ε > 0, there exists
Kl such that
Pr
(
pk < P l(ωk) + ε for all k > Kl
)
> 1− ε.
We will show that the same condition holds when each l is replaced with l + 1.
For any δ > 0, combining A1 with the inductive hypothesis, there exists some Kl+1 such that
Pr
(
Q
(
ωk,pk
)
< E(P l + ε1)(ωk) + δ ∀k > Kl+1
)
> 1− ε− δ.
Substituting for Q
(
ωk,pk
)
using (5), we have
Pr
(
pk < (1− ρ)d(ωk) + ρE(P l + ε1)(ωk) + δ ∀k > Kl+1
)
> 1− ε− δ.
Given any γ > 0, since E is continuous, there exist some ε, δ ∈ (0, γ) such that, for each ω,
ρE(P l + ε1)(ω) + δ < ρE(P l)(ω) + γ. Since ε and δ are arbitrary, we have that, for some Kl+1,
Pr
(
pk < (1− ρ)d(ωk) + ρE(P l)(ωk) + γ ∀k > Kl+1
)
> 1− γ.
Since P l+1 = (1− ρ)d+ ρE(P l), this completes the proof of the inductive step.
3.3 Presence of rational agents
We now consider a setting in which some agents form rational expectations. For simplicity, we
assume that the population consists of two parts. A fraction pi of agents are rational while the
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remaining 1 − pi are coarse thinkers who use a prediction rule QC satisfying A1. Rational agents
know QC and the underlying Markov process, and form rational expectations of the forecasts formed
by coarse thinkers in the next period. The rational agents’ prediction rule QR satisfies
QR
(
ωk,pk
)
= E
[
(1− ρ)d(ωk+1) + ρ
(
(1− pi)QC
(
ωk+1,pk+1
)
+ piQR
(
ωk+1,pk+1
))∣∣∣ωk] .
(8)
This equation implies that rational agents correctly predict prices given the history to date and the
prediction rules used by other agents.
While the model in the main text does not include rational agents, it does allow for some agents
to perfectly distinguish among states. In the present setting, these agents are not rational insofar
as their price forecasts are based only on past data and do not explicitly account for other agents’
forecasts. We show here that, in the long-run, the difference between these agents and rational
agents is immaterial. Long-run prices are identical if we replace any share of agents using the finest
categorization with agents who form rational expectations.
A2. For each ω ∈ Ω, K ∈ N, and almost every ω ∈ ΩN,
lim
k→∞
(
QC
((
ωk, ω
)
,pk
)
−QC
((
ωk+K , ω
)
,pk+K
))
= 0,
where, for each κ, ωκ denotes the projection of ω onto its first κ components.
Roughly speaking, A2 says that data from a fixed finite number of recent periods eventually
has little impact on forecasts once the total quantity of data is large. Note that A2 is satisfied by
the similarity-based learning procedure of Section 3.1.
Proposition 3. Suppose that a fraction pi of the population form rational expectations, and the
remaining 1 − pi use a prediction procedure QC satisfying A1 with bound EC(P ) and A2. Suppose
further that the mapping (1 − ρ)d + ρEC(P ) is a contraction. Then the price vector P (ω) almost
surely converges to the unique solution of
P (ωk) = (1− ρ)d(ωk) + ρ
(
piE [P (ωk+1) | ωk] + (1− pi)EC(P )(ωk)
)
.
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Lemma 3. If QC satisfies A1 with bound EC and A2 then QR satisfies A1 with bound
ER(P )(ωk) = E
[ ∞∑
l=1
(piρ)l−1(1− ρ)d(ωk+l) + (1− pi)ρ
∞∑
l=1
(piρ)l−1EC(P )(ωk+l)
∣∣∣∣∣ωk
]
. (9)
Proof of Lemma 3. Iterating (8) gives
QR
(
ωk,pk
)
= E
[ ∞∑
l=1
(piρ)l−1(1− ρ)d(ωk+l) + (1− pi)ρ
∞∑
l=1
(piρ)l−1QC
(
ωk+l,pk+l
)∣∣∣∣∣ωk
]
.
We need to show that for any P , P ∈ [p, p]Ω, any K, and any ε > 0, if condition (6) holds, then
for any δ > 0 there exists K ′ such that (7) holds for QR. We prove only the upper bound; the
proof of the lower bound is similar.
Accordingly, suppose that (6) holds for some ε > 0 and K. Fix δ > 0. Since QC and EC are
bounded, there exists M such that, for every ωk and pk
QR
(
ωk,pk
)
<
E
[ ∞∑
l=1
(piρ)l−1(1− ρ)d(ωk+l) + (1− pi)ρ
(
M∑
l=1
(piρ)l−1QC
(
ωk+l,pk+l
)
+
∞∑
l=M+1
(piρ)l−1EC(P )(ωk+l)
)∣∣∣∣∣ωk
]
+ δ/3. (10)
Since QC satisfies A1, there exists some K ′ such that, for each ω,
Pr
(
QC
((
ωk−1, ω
)
,pk
)
< EC(P )(ω) + δ/3M ∀k > K ′
)
> 1− ε− δ/2. (11)
By A2, there exists some K ′′ such that, for each l = 1, . . . ,M ,
Pr
(
QC
(
ωk+l,pk+l
)
< QC
((
ωk−1, ωk+l
)
,pk
)
+ δ/3M ∀k > K ′′ | ωk
)
> 1− δ/2M. (12)
Combining (11) and (12) gives
Pr
(
QC
(
ωk+l,pk+l
)
< EC(P )(ωk+l) + 2δ/3M ∀k > max{K ′,K ′′}, ∀l = 1, . . . ,M | ωk
)
> 1−ε−δ.
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Combining the last inequality with (10) gives
Pr
(
QR
(
ωk,pk
)
< ER(P )(ωk) + δ ∀k > max{K ′,K ′′}
)
> 1− ε− δ,
as needed.
Proof of Proposition 3. Combining Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and Proposition 2, the cluster points lie
between the extremal solutions to
P = (1− ρ)d+ ρ (piER(P ) + (1− pi)EC(P )) .
Substituting for ER(P ) using (9) leads to
P (ωk) = (1− ρ)d(ωk) + ρpiE
[ ∞∑
l=1
(piρ)l−1(1− ρ)d(ωk+l) + (1− pi)ρ
∞∑
l=1
(piρ)l−1EC(P )(ωk+l)
∣∣∣∣∣ωk
]
+ ρ(1− pi)EC(P )(ωk)
= (1− ρ)d(ωk) + ρpiE
[
E
[ ∞∑
l=1
(piρ)l−1(1− ρ)d(ωk+l) + (1− pi)ρ
∞∑
l=1
(piρ)l−1EC(P )(ωk+l)
∣∣∣∣∣ωk+1
]∣∣∣∣∣ωk
]
+ ρ(1− pi)EC(P )(ωk)
= (1− ρ)d(ωk) + ρ
(
piE[P (ωk+1)|ωk] + (1− pi)EC(P )(ωk)
)
,
where the second last equality follows from the Law of Iterated Expectations, and the final equality
uses the first equality with ωk+1 in place of ωk.
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